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BOOTSTRAPPING 
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Law often develops through accretion. The common law and precedent 
involve courts building on what came before as they reach new decisions. The 
earlier decisions lay the groundwork for later ones. Slippery slopes are a 
particular kind of accretion: a conclusion that might seem unreasonable if taken 
in one fell swoop becomes reasonable because of the many small steps that 
precede it. In both situations, a decision depends on earlier ones—or, to put the 
point differently, earlier decisions enable the later one. This is of course a 
familiar story, and the accretive process of precedent is largely taken for 
granted in the United States. 
Accretion often involves many different actors and many different steps. 
Consider a more directed, and direct, process: an actor undertakes action Y that 
enables that actor’s action Z. As with the development of precedent, the later 
action depends on the earlier one, but in this case a given actor is creating the 
conditions for its later actions. The actor is engaged in bootstrapping—using its 
own volitional actions to empower it to take other actions. 
Every action a person can take depends on the circumstances created by 
prior actions. One can walk into a building because someone built that building, 
one can own money because a monetary system was created, etc. Some of those 
conditions precedent are created by the actor herself. For example, walking into 
a given building depends on earlier decisions to be in that city and to go to that 
building. A person routinely enables her own action Z by first undertaking 
action Y without which Z would be impossible. Government institutions 
operate similarly: they rely on the earlier acts of others, for instance those who 
founded the nation or those who created the businesses they regulate. And 
government institutions rely in part on the acts of their predecessors. A 
Supreme Court holding on any issue depends on a series of decisions that its 
predecessors made. 
This article focuses on bootstrapping based not on the physical enablement 
of Z but instead on its legal enablement—situations in which action Y 
transforms Z from legally problematic, if not clearly impermissible, to legally 
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permissible. That is, an actor undertakes permissible action Y and thereby 
renders its action Z legally permissible, as the actor’s undertaking of Z absent Y 
would raise serious legal problems. For example, the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Bolling v. Sharpe1 would have been difficult to defend absent Brown v. Board of 
Education.2 Brown in turn relied on Sweatt v. Painter3 and other earlier cases 
that had chipped away at the “separate but equal” doctrine, and later cases that 
would have seemed barely conceivable absent Brown relied on Brown for 
legitimacy. 
The idea behind bootstrapping is that by undertaking Y, an actor creates the 
conditions that enable that actor to undertake some further action Z. This is 
different from estoppel, in which others’ failure to object to earlier Ys is treated 
as preventing them from objecting to a new iteration of Y. In that situation, the 
earlier Ys have played an important role for the actor, but that role is to 
consolidate its ability to undertake similar actions.4 Bootstrapping is different in 
that the actor is undertaking a further action that is beyond its precedents, and 
it does not rely on others’ failure to object. The point of estoppel is that the 
actor says, in effect, “I am doing the exact same thing that I did in the past, and 
your lack of concern about those earlier actions prevents you from objecting 
now.” Bootstrapping, on the other hand, involves a new action that goes beyond 
what was done in the past. 
Bootstrapping is also different from estoppel in that estoppel may rely on Ys 
undertaken by others, but in bootstrapping the same actor undertakes Y and Z. 
The same point applies in distinguishing bootstrapping from path dependence 
or a slippery slope.5 Neither path dependence nor a slippery slope necessarily 
involves a given actor building on its own prior actions. A key element of 
bootstrapping is an actor using two or more steps to achieve an outcome it 
could not achieve with a single step. The actor does not merely build on 
conditions precedent that have arisen, but instead creates those conditions 
precedent. A less important difference for my purposes between bootstrapping 
and path dependence or a slippery slope is that path dependence often, and a 
slippery slope by definition, entails many small steps that over time produce a 
given result. Slippery slopes in particular involve an accretion of small measures 
that results in a significant change. Bootstrapping, by contrast, often entails a 
simple step function rather than a slope. Bootstrapping can involve a series of 
 
 1.  347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 2.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3.  339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 4.  See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008) (“[I]f pervasive enough, a history of 
congressional acquiescence can be treated as a ‘gloss on “Executive Power” vested in the President by § 
1 of Art. II.’”) (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)). For a discussion of the 
significance of acquiescence in creating a form of estoppel, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. 
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 5.  For a discussion on path dependence, see Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and 
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643–62 (1996). For a discussion on slippery slopes, see generally 
Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003) and Frederick 
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985).  
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small changes that build up over time—and insofar as it does so, it overlaps with 
a slippery slope created by a single actor—but it need not do so. 
Bootstrapping has particular current salience in the context of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010.6 The main response to the 
argument that the ACA exceeds Congress’s commerce power relies on two 
apparent bootstraps. First, in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act (EMTALA), Congress required emergency rooms to treat patients 
whether they could pay or not, which means that individuals can receive health 
care paid by others.7 Congress could then say that forgoing insurance affected 
interstate commerce, because the guarantee of emergency room service meant 
that the non-purchase of insurance shifted costs from some individuals onto 
others. Second, in the ACA, Congress prohibited insurance companies from 
disallowing coverage based on preexisting conditions and from charging higher 
premiums because of a person’s medical condition or history.8 As many 
commentators have noted, these prohibitions effectively necessitate an 
individual mandate or something like it (or else many people would forgo 
insurance in good health and sign insurance forms on their way to the hospital).9 
What is wrong with bootstrapping? It seems to hit a constitutional nerve, as 
it were, when government institutions engage in it. An entity takes action Y that 
empowers it to take action Z that might further empower it. The institution is 
able to ratchet up its power by itself, creating an upward spiral of its power 
based on its own actions. The obvious concern is that an institution is able to 
create and control the conditions that empower it. Giving government actors 
the ability to determine their own limits—or lack thereof—allows for 
aggrandizement. The key is that an entity is empowering itself, rather than 
being part of a process involving many different entities. This raises fears about 
an actor concentrating its own power, contrary to foundational principles 
articulated in The Federalist10 and embodied in constitutional provisions 
creating a government of limited, separated powers. Some bootstraps by 
nongovernment actors may trouble us (to tweak the definition of chutzpah, 
imagine that a person who kills her parents thereby becomes automatically 
eligible for benefits as an orphan). But this article’s focus is on governmental 
 
 6.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.).  
 7.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West 2010). 
 8.  Id. § 300gg-3a (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage may not impose any preexisting condition exclusion with respect to such plan 
or coverage.”); id. § 300gg(a)(1) (prohibiting insurers from charging higher premiums except on the 
basis of age, rating area, tobacco use, and whether the policy covers individuals or families). The ban on 
exclusions based on preexisting conditions is sometimes called “guaranteed issue” (because it 
guarantees the issuance of insurance to those with preexisting conditions). The limitation on the bases 
for charging higher premiums is usually called “community rating” (because everyone in a given 
community is treated similarly, even though some people would be expected to have higher health care 
costs). 
 9.  See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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institutions, because a key element of bootstrapping is self-empowerment, and 
that practice raises fears of government aggrandizement that have a particular 
historical and constitutional pedigree. 
One can and probably should distinguish among aggrandizing outcomes. 
The Supreme Court, for example, has treated aggrandizing actions that invade 
another branch’s authority (as opposed to aggrandizement that does not so 
invade) as particularly troubling.11 This is a relevant axis, but it is orthogonal to 
the issues this article addresses. The possible illegitimacy of an outcome does 
not automatically condemn the process that produced it. Any process can 
produce a bad outcome. The question on which this article focuses is the 
legitimacy of the bootstrapping process. The unconstitutionality or illegitimacy 
of action Z is an independent reason to reject Z, but not a reason to reject the 
process by which all Zs are created. 
Many courts and commentators have addressed the sufficiency of a 
connection between conditions precedent and what they allegedly enable, 
particularly in the Commerce Clause context. For example, should the Supreme 
Court find a sufficient connection to interstate commerce if Congress had a 
rational basis for finding a substantial connection between gun-related school 
violence and interstate commerce?12 And, once a test is chosen, is it satisfied—is 
there a sufficient connection between the allegedly enabling condition and what 
it enables? Even a rational basis test likely would not be satisfied if Congress 
tried to regulate backyard cookouts based on its past declarations of a 
commemorative National Ice Cream Day. The connection between the two is 
just too tenuous.13 
The issue addressed in this article is different: Are there categories of 
situations in which there is a sufficient empirical connection between the 
enabling condition and what it enables, but the bootstrap itself is illegitimate? 
So my focus is not on the test for sufficiency or its application, but instead on 
whether there are forms of bootstrapping that should be rejected even though Y 
in fact enables Z (and any reasonable decisionmaker would so conclude). More 
specifically, my question is whether there are situations in which a particular 
category of bootstrap is particularly troubling even though Y is permissible and 
justifies Z, and Z does not violate an independent constitutional right. If Z is 
unconstitutional or otherwise illegitimate whether or not Y exists, then Y is not 
 
 11.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (emphasizing the importance of “encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other”); N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982) (“The constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to 
guard against ‘encroachment or aggrandizement’ by Congress at the expense of the other branches of 
government.”) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) 
(emphasizing “[t]he dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions”). 
 12.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 618 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]e must ask 
whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or substantial) connection 
between gun-related school violence and interstate commerce.”).  
 13.  Cf. id. at 567 (“The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic 
activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate 
commerce.”).  
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legally enabling Z and there is no bootstrap, because Z is illegitimate anyway. 
Put differently, this article addresses the circumstances under which the act of 
bootstrapping is a problem and thus delegitimizes the enabled decision. 
Governmental bootstrapping is not limited to the Commerce Clause 
context, or even to congressional enactments. Examples abound of government 
institutions relying on their decisions to legitimate other decisions they 
undertake. Precedent can serve this function—allowing a court (or the 
President) to do in a few steps what it could not do in one. 
My inquiry is not limited to whether particular categories of bootstrapping 
violate the Constitution, much less whether the Supreme Court would find 
those categories unconstitutional. I want to ask a broader question: Are there 
categories of bootstrapping that we as lawyers and citizens should treat as 
particularly troubling forms of aggrandizement, even if they would not run 
afoul of a specific constitutional prohibition?14 What is troubling will differ from 
person to person, of course, but what I mean to ask is whether the 
aggrandizement concerns that motivate fears about governmental 
bootstrapping are sufficiently greater in some contexts that we can distinguish 
them from other forms of bootstrapping. As I will discuss below, bootstrapping 
is pervasive. My question is whether we can identify differences among 
bootstraps that should lead lawyers and citizens to reject bootstraps of 
particular types. 
Part II sets up the analysis by focusing on the most prominent recent 
examples of bootstrapping, arising out of the ACA’s mandate that individuals 
purchase health insurance. The arguments against bootstrapping are 
consequentialist ones, grounded in fears about the results of bootstrapping. Part 
III discusses some key features of bootstraps, including their ubiquity, and thus 
the undesirability of disallowing all of them. Part IV turns to the question of 
distinguishing problematic bootstraps from other bootstraps, based either on 
substantive distinctions or on the purposes of the bootstrapper. I find that there 
are no useful substantive distinctions, and that purpose also does not give rise to 
useful distinctions, with one possible exception. That possible exception is a 
distinction based on the certainty of the bootstrap. A focus on certainty gives 
rise to a possible distinction between simultaneous and nonsimultaneous 
bootstraps, as Y’s enablement of Z will be clear when they are simultaneous, 
but the promulgation of Z will not be certain when they are separated in time. I 
find that this distinction would impose no meaningful hurdles to the President’s 
ability to bootstrap but would impose very significant costs on Congress, and 
that those costs outweigh its benefits. The cure is worse than the disease. 
 
 14.  So violating a constitutional norm (like the limits imposed by the Interstate Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses) is sufficient but not necessary. 
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II 
BOOTSTRAPPING AND THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
My launching point is the argument that the individual mandate15 in the 
ACA exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Many arguments 
have been put forward against the individual mandate, some focusing on 
particular cases, some focusing on the Commerce Clause versus the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, etc. I am interested in one particular species of argument 
against the individual mandate—that focused on bootstrapping. 
One justification for the individual mandate that operates as a bootstrap is 
the set of ACA provisions that forbid exclusions based on preexisting 
conditions and that sharply limit the bases upon which insurers can charge 
higher premiums.16 The individual mandate is designed to counteract the 
incentives created by these provisions.17 This is particularly clear with respect to 
preexisting conditions: Without a coverage mandate to accompany the ban on 
exclusions for preexisting conditions, “many people would simply wait to 
purchase insurance until they needed care. This ‘adverse selection’ would force 
the price of insurance higher for sick people who want to maintain continuous 
coverage.”18 As Randy Barnett has stated, “Congress exercises its commerce 
power to impose mandates on insurance companies and then claims these 
 
 15.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a) (West 2010) (“An applicable individual shall for each month 
beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an 
applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.”). 
 16.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West 2010) (“[I]f there were no [individual mandate], many 
individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By significantly increasing 
health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will 
minimize this adverse selection . . . . The [individual mandate] is essential to creating effective health 
insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not 
exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.”). 
 18.  Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825, 
1841 (2011); see also Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue in the Individual 
Health Insurance Market, NIHCM Foundation, Jan. 2011, available at http://nihcm.org/pdf/EV-
LoSassoFINAL.pdf (“The primary concern with community rating and guaranteed issue is that these 
regulations can lead to adverse selection, destabilizing the insurance market and potentially causing 
total market collapse. This scenario is commonly termed an adverse selection death spiral. Aware of 
these concerns, policymakers included a provision in the ACA mandating all individuals to have health 
insurance.”); Making Health Care Work for American Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Uwe Reinhardt, 
Professor of Economics and Pub. Affairs, Princeton Univ.) (“[C]ommunity-rating and guaranteed issue, 
coupled with voluntary insurance, tends to lead to a death spiral of individual insurance.”); Brief for 
Petitioners, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-398 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2012), 2012 WL 37168, at *18 
(“[G]uaranteed-issue and community-rating enacted in isolation create a spiral of higher costs and 
reduced coverage because individuals can wait to enroll until they are sick.”); Adele M. Kirk, Riding 
the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky, and Massachusetts, 25 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 133, 152 (2000) (stating that all but one private insurer left Kentucky after 
the state limited exclusions based on preexisting conditions); Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New 
York’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 71, 91–92 (2000) (after New York enacted 
legislation containing guaranteed issue and community rating for health insurance without an 
individual mandate, “[t]here was a dramatic exodus of indemnity insurers from New York’s individual 
market”). 
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insurance mandates will not have their desired effects unless it can impose 
mandates on the people, which would be unconstitutional if imposed on their 
own.”19 
A second bootstrap involves EMTALA.20 That statute prohibits hospitals 
from refusing to stabilize emergency patients on the basis of their ability to pay 
or insurance status, thereby effectively turning every person into a potential 
cost that is shifted from the individual to hospitals.21 The individual mandate 
forces individuals to internalize that cost. As Randy Barnett further explains, 
it is claimed that because everyone will one day need health care and may not be able 
to afford it when that day arrives, and because emergency rooms are obligated by law 
to provide care regardless of ability to pay, it is necessary to require that all persons 
purchase health insurance today to avoid shifting costs to others.
22
 
So, once EMTALA was passed, an individual mandate could fairly be 
characterized as simply shifting economic impacts from providers to consumers. 
Without EMTALA, the ACA’s individual mandate would be harder to justify 
as a cost-shifting mechanism because hospitals would not be legally required to 
provide uncompensated emergency care, and thus there would be no legal 
burden of costs to shift. Again, opponents have decried this bootstrap. As the 
Revere America Foundation wrote in an amicus brief about EMTALA and the 
resulting free riders as a justification for the individual mandate, “that problem 
is of Congress’ own creation, and Congress cannot bootstrap itself into powers 
not enumerated by the Constitution simply because it deems the exercise of 
those powers expedient in light of other regulations that it has previously 
 
 19.  Randy E. Barnett, Turning Citizens into Subjects: Why the Health Insurance Mandate Is 
Unconstitutional, 62 MERCER L. REV. 608, 614 (2011); see also Opening/Response Brief of 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant States, Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 2011 WL 1944107, at *39–40 (“The 
government also contends that the individual mandate is incidental to ‘the requirement that insurers 
extend coverage and set premiums without regard to pre-existing medical conditions.’ The government 
insists that this requirement ‘would not work without’ the individual mandate because the requirement 
will encourage consumers to refrain from buying insurance until they are injured or sick. . . . The 
Constitution does not permit this type of blatant bootstrapping—create a problem and then assert that 
it is necessary and proper to fix the problem by asserting an authority the Constitution otherwise denies 
the federal government.”) (internal citation omitted).  
 20.  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
 21.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(h) (West 2010) (“A participating hospital may not delay provision of an 
appropriate medical screening examination . . . or further medical examination and treatment . . . in 
order to inquire about the individual’s method of payment or insurance status.”). Before the passage of 
EMTALA, some hospitals provided emergency care regardless of ability to pay and others did not. See 
Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the Emergency Medicine 
Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 145, 146–47 (2004). 
EMTALA created a uniform requirement of basic coverage. 
 22.  Barnett, supra note 19, at 614; see also Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1295 n.101 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 U.S. 603 (Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-393); Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 
132 U.S. 604 (Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398); Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 U.S. 604 
(Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400) (noting the government’s reliance on EMTALA and stating “the plaintiffs 
point out that the government’s contention amounts to a bootstrapping argument. Under the 
government’s theory, Congress can enlarge its own powers under the Commerce Clause by legislating a 
market externality into existence, and then claiming an extra-constitutional fix is required”). 
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enacted.”23 
Those who attack this form of bootstrapping contend that the relevant 
bootstrap is illegitimate because it goes too far. Critics fear that allowing this 
bootstrapping would give Congress the power to compel economic activity, 
which it can then regulate under the Commerce Clause.24 
It is worth unpacking these bootstrapping arguments a bit. The argument 
against bootstrapping is not that the individual mandate violates some 
independent constitutional right (e.g., the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause).25 The opponents of bootstrapping are not arguing that the 
enabling provision (e.g., EMTALA) is illegitimate. They are not denying that 
there is a sufficient empirical connection between the enabler (e.g., EMTALA) 
and what it enables (a requirement that people who can impose costs on 
emergency rooms bear those costs themselves through insurance).26 Instead, 
they are focusing on the illegitimacy of relying on Y to justify Z because of the 
implications of accepting such reasoning. The problem seems to be one of 
consequences: Allowing Y to enable Z allows for aggrandizement, possibly 
unending aggrandizement.27 If we allow this bootstrapping, what is the limit? 
 
 23.  Brief of Revere America Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees/Cross Appellants, Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235 (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 2011 
WL 2530512 at *10; see also Brief for the Am. Legislative Exch. Council as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (U.S. filed Feb. 13, 
2012), 2012 WL 504620 at *14–15 (“[T]he cost-shifting in this case is largely of Congress's own creation, 
stemming from the requirement in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395dd, that hospitals provide emergency medical care regardless of ability to pay. Congress cannot 
bootstrap a radical expansion of its Commerce power simply by legislating cost-shifting measures.”); 
Brief of Amici Curiae Docs4patientcare, the Benjamin Rush Society, and the Pacific Research 
Institute, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 648 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-11021), 
2011 WL 2530507, at *22 (characterizing the argument that EMTALA justifies the individual mandate 
as “disingenuous bootstrapping” and adding: “The federal government cannot expand its own authority 
by manufacturing the circumstances of uncompensated care and claiming that such circumstances now 
affect interstate commerce.”); Opening/Response Brief for Appellee, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058), 2011 WL 1115016 at *43–44 (“While it is 
true that Congress has directly regulated aspects of the health care system, principally by mandating 
emergency room treatment by hospitals receiving federal funds . . . the question in this case is whether 
Congress can command a citizen to purchase insurance solely for the convenience of the government in 
regulating market distortions caused, at least in part, by previous congressional regulation.”). 
 24.  See Brief of Revere America Foundation, supra note 23, at *24 (“Under the Government’s 
theory, Congress can impress unwilling individuals into commerce and compel them to buy unwanted 
products whenever doing so is deemed by Congress to be essential to some larger regulatory plan.”); 
see also Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1351 n.14 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“For reasons that remain inexplicable to me, the majority opinion seems to suggest that the 
individual mandate is a ‘bridge too far’—in the words of the district court—not because it conscripts the 
inactive, but rather for some inchoate reason stated at the highest order of abstraction.”). 
 25.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26.  Some bootstrapping opponents make some or all of these arguments in addition to their 
complaints about bootstrapping, but I am focusing on the bootstrapping arguments specifically. 
 27.  See Reply Brief for Appellants, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-2388), 2011 WL 1653756 at *16 (“[I]f Congress can force a private citizen to engage in 
commercial or economic activity under penalty of federal law—whether exercising its authority under 
the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause—then it can regulate virtually anything, and 
the federal government is no longer one of limited and enumerated powers.”); Robert A. Levy, The 
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This is a consequentialist argument, one that might resonate for many 
judges. The argument here is not that bootstrapping is illogical or immoral or 
unethical, but rather that it produces, or can produce, undesirable outcomes. 
The particular undesirable outcome, in the context of the individual mandate, is 
limitless congressional power: If we allow Congress to use EMTALA and the 
provisions on preexisting conditions and community rating to enable it to 
require an individual mandate, Congress can mandate anything the 
Constitution does not specifically prohibit.28 More generally, a governmental 
 
Case Against President Obama’s Health Care Reform: A Primer for Nonlawyers, CATO INST., 6–7 (Apr. 
25, 2011), http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/ObamaHealthCareReform-Levy.pdf (“Essentially, the 
insurance mandate is regulatory bootstrapping of the worst sort. Congress forces someone to engage in 
commerce, then proclaims that the activity may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. If Congress 
can do that, it can prescribe all manner of human conduct.”); The Constitutionality of the Affordable 
Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Michael 
Carvin, Partner, Jones Day) (“[A]llowing Congress to impose an ‘individual mandate’ on Americans to 
offset the costs created by Congressional regulation would mean that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
eviscerates all limits on Congress’s enumerated powers.”); Memorandum of Amici Curiae, Former 
United States Attorneys General William Barr, Edwin Meese, and Dick Thornburgh, in Support of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 18, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 
768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 3:10cv001880), 2010 WL 4168827 (“If one does not apply the Necessary and 
Proper Clause according to its meaning, the government could claim virtually any power simply by 
citing one of the myriad federal laws that—by being carried out—affects the economy, and then 
claiming that it wishes to force individuals to participate in a certain fashion to adjust for the 
consequences of those laws.”); Opening/Response Brief for Appellee, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058), 2011 WL 1115016 at *44–45 (“[T]he claim that citizens 
can be commanded to purchase goods or services from another citizen in order to increase the 
efficiency of the federal government’s regulation of commercial actors goes beyond the negative outer 
limits of the Commerce Clause, even as aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause, because the claimed 
power would be unlimited and indistinguishable from a national police power.”); Brief for the Am. 
Legislative Exch. Council, supra note 23, at *14 (“The Government’s theory in this case reduces to the 
idea that an individual’s failure to purchase health insurance has a negative effect on the interstate 
market for health insurance, as compared to when individuals uniformly purchase such insurance under 
Government compulsion. But this bootstrapping rationale is equally true—that is, trivially so—with 
respect to nearly every individual decision not to participate in commerce: Congress can always 
conceive of some activity which, if mandated, would substantially affect interstate commerce. . . . Such a 
conception of the Commerce Clause is indistinguishable from a plenary federal police power.”); Reply 
Brief for Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-11156), 2010 WL 4784262 (arguing that the 
doctrine of enumerated powers would be eviscerated if Congress could expand its powers by issuing a 
finding of “essentiality” in a regulatory scheme); Brief of Members of the U.S. Senate and Speaker of 
the House of Representatives John Boehner as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235 (No. 11-11021), 2011 WL 2530520 at *31 (“The [Necessary and 
Proper] Clause is not a blanket grant of Congressional power to be invoked by Congress whenever its 
constitutionally-permissible provisions have bad real-world results that can only be mitigated by 
otherwise unconstitutional provisions.”); see also Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1351 (Marcus, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Perhaps at the heart of the plaintiffs’ objection to the 
mandate—adopted by the majority opinion in conclusion, if not in reasoning—is the notion that 
allowing the individual mandate to stand will convert Congress’ commerce power into a plenary police 
power, admitting of no limits and knowing of no bounds. The parade of horribles said to follow 
ineluctably from upholding the individual mandate includes the federal government’s ability to compel 
us to purchase and consume broccoli, buy General Motors vehicles, and exercise three times a week.”). 
 28.  See supra note 27; Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 
2d 1256, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of 
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institution, finding itself with less power than it would like, and in particular the 
inability to implement Z, could make decision X and thereby empower itself to 
make decision Y, which would further empower it to undertake Z. The 
governmental institution could thus engage in repeated stepwise increases in 
power. Randy Barnett succinctly stated the possible result of allowing the 
bootstraps in the ACA: “By this reasoning, Congress would now have the 
general police power the Supreme Court has always denied it possessed.”29 
III 
BOOTSTRAPS AS A CATEGORY 
Given the fears of aggrandizement, one obvious response would be to 
disallow any actions that have this aggrandizing form. If we are worried about 
increases in power, why not prohibit all of them? 
At the outset, note a basic textual problem for a prohibition on all 
congressional bootstrapping. The language of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
necessarily means that at least some bootstrapping is constitutionally 
authorized. The text of the clause gives Congress the authority to “make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the 
specifically enumerated powers.30 To have meaning, this language must, like any 
 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-393); Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
Florida, 132 S. C.t 604 (Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398); Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. 
Ct. 604 (Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400) (“If Congress is allowed to define the scope of its power merely by 
arguing that a provision is ‘necessary’ to avoid the negative consequences that will potentially flow from 
its own statutory enactments, the Necessary and Proper Clause runs the risk of ceasing to be the 
‘perfectly harmless’ part of the Constitution that Hamilton assured us it was, and moves that much 
closer to becoming the ‘hideous monster [with] devouring jaws’ that he assured us it was not.”). 
  Indeed, some opponents have suggested that allowing the bootstrap will produce particularly 
pernicious forms of aggrandizement. House Republican Leader John Boehner argued in an amicus 
brief that this bootstrapping could create the wrong incentives for Congress. Brief of House Republican 
Leader John Boehner as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, 
Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (No. 3:10-cv-91) (“If adopted by the court, this 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause would create incentives for Congress to pass ill-
conceived or unrealistic statutes.”).  
In his opinion, Judge Vinson emphasized this possibility, writing,  
Such an application of the Necessary and Proper Clause would have the perverse effect of 
enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or economically disruptive statutes, secure in the 
knowledge that the more dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or 
“necessary” the statutory fix would be. Under such a rationale, the more harm the statute 
does, the more power Congress could assume for itself under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1297; see also Levy, supra note 27, at 10 (“Once again, Judge 
Vinson saw through the sophistry: The mandate is artificially necessary—required only because 
Congress went down a particular path that left few if any alternatives.”). 
 29.  Barnett, supra note 19, at 614. Perhaps some might suggest that the claimed bootstraps are 
overstated, reasoning that EMTALA and the ban on preexisting condition exclusions do not change 
the legal landscape very much, so the individual mandate does not depend on them. If that is true, then 
the concerns created by bootstrapping are overstated as well. That is, the less work that is done by 
bootstrapping, and the less common they are, the less we need to be worried about their aggrandizing 
potential.  
 30.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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grant of power, authorize Congress to enact legislation that Congress would not 
have the authority to enact in the absence of the language. Whatever the limits 
of its meaning, the Necessary and Proper Clause at its textual core means that 
laws passed within Congress’s enumerated authority can authorize other laws 
(those “necessary and proper for carrying into execution” those enumerated 
powers) that would otherwise be outside of Congress’s authority. In other 
words, legislation enacted pursuant to enumerated powers is the Y that enables 
the Z that the Necessary and Proper Clause covers at a minimum.31 
The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers only Congress, and there is no 
similar empowerment of the President or the Supreme Court. There are broad 
grants of power.32 But there is no provision with respect to the President or the 
Supreme Court that clearly authorizes bootstrapping. So the only entity that is 
textually guaranteed some ability to bootstrap is Congress. 
The textual argument, however, is sufficient but not necessary. Regardless 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, any suggestion of the illegitimacy of 
bootstrapping cuts much too broadly. No government entity could meaningfully 
function without bootstrapping. Congress provides the most obvious 
illustration. Every enactment depends in part on conditions precedent that 
previous Congresses helped to create. The multitude of federal regulations of 
interstate banks relies on the impact of earlier federal actions providing for 
interstate banks.33 Regulation of activities on federal properties can exist 
because the federal government chose to have those properties in the first 
place. For that matter, Congress’s ability to regulate any company depends on a 
series of earlier legislative decisions allowing the company to enter its line of 
business, not to mention earlier enactments that protected the United States 
from its enemies and allowed companies to exist. Simply stated, every piece of 
legislation is predicated in part on a state of affairs that previous Congresses 
helped to create. 
Another point bears emphasizing. Bootstrapping involves the use of Y to 
legitimate Z—doing Z directly would be problematic because of some hurdle, 
and Y enables Z by overcoming that hurdle. This highlights the fact that 
bootstrapping depends on the existence of a hurdle in the first place. An actor 
with plenary power (say, an absolute monarch) has no need to bootstrap, 
because it can always undertake Z, whether or not it has undertaken Y first. Or, 
to use an example closer to home, in a world in which everyone agreed that the 
interstate commerce power authorized any regulation Congress deemed 
appropriate, there would be no role for bootstrapping in the Commerce Clause 
 
 31.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 
(2010); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 32.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”). 
 33.  See, e.g., National Currency Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 
1244 (1927). 
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context. Congress could simply enact any Z that it wanted, regardless of the 
presence or absence of any conditions precedent. By the same token, the hurdle 
must be superable. If there is no Y that could enable a particular Z—say, the 
goal of the President attaining absolute power—then bootstrapping is not an 
issue. An institution’s ability to use Y to legitimate Z is a function of the 
relevant legal test. 
The centrality of the relevant test relates to another point: For many tests, 
inaction is as important as action. This puts enormous weight on the decisions 
of an actor’s predecessors—either to act or not to act. For instance, in Reno v. 
ACLU,34 the Supreme Court ruled that the modest First Amendment 
protections for broadcast television were inapplicable to the Internet.35 A 
central distinction for the Court was the long history of broadcast regulation, as 
contrasted with the absence of such a history with respect to the Internet.36 
Regulation of the broadcast spectrum helped to enable later broadcast 
regulation, but the failure to regulate the Internet helped to doom later Internet 
regulation. Public forum doctrine is another example. If the government places 
limits on the use of a forum when it creates the forum, courts will treat those 
limits as demarcating its openness.37 “Once it has opened a limited forum, 
however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”38 
Deciding exactly what if any limits to impose at the outset thus has major 
implications for later regulation. Beyond that, the Supreme Court sometimes 
relies on the existence, or nonexistence, of early congressional enactments in 
determining the constitutionality of a recent enactment. Printz v. United States,39 
for example, in invalidating a 1993 statute’s imposition of responsibilities on 
states without their consent, placed great emphasis on the absence of early 
congressional enactments imposing similar responsibilities.40 The failure of 
earlier Congresses to enact such statutes undermined its successors’ ability to do 
so.41 
Bootstrapping’s emphasis on conditions precedent—the existence or 
 
 34.  521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 35.  Id. at 867. 
 36.  Id. (distinguishing Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), because 
“the order in Pacifica [was] issued by an agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades”); 
id. at 868 (noting that the Court “relied on the history of extensive Government regulation of the 
broadcast medium” in its broadcasting jurisprudence); id. at 868–69 (“Neither before nor after the 
enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic forums of the Internet been subject to the type of 
government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.”). 
 37.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The 
necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may 
justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 40.  Id. at 907–08. 
 41.  The emphasis on history is particularly notable in the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, who has 
emphasized the importance of “universal and long-established American legislative practice” as a 
relevant consideration in interpreting the First Amendment. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 375–77 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
BENJAMIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2012 8:26 AM 
No. 3 2012] BOOTSTRAPPING 127 
nonexistence of a given set of prior actions—means not only that a previous 
undertaking of those actions will enable further action, but also that the failure 
to undertake those earlier actions will make it harder to take further action. In 
this way, and importantly, allowing (or disallowing) bootstrapping will often 
have no clear valence. And bootstrapping can occur with individual rights as 
well as congressional power, as the path to Brown v. Board of Education 
reveals.42 Sometimes bootstrapping aggrandizes congressional power and 
sometimes it doesn’t. 
Bootstrapping involving Congress’s commerce power is about congressional 
power and does have a clear valence, given the tests that the Supreme Court 
uses to determine the limits of that power. Congress’s failure to enact 
EMTALA in year A in no way made it harder for Congress to pass EMTALA 
in year A+B, and therefore had no impact on the ability of Congress to enact an 
individual mandate in year A+B+C. But many tests will place weight not only 
on action but also on inaction, as the example of broadcasting and the Internet 
reveals.43 
IV 
DISTINGUISHING AMONG BOOTSTRAPS 
Can’t one separate problematic from unproblematic bootstrapping? The 
fact that bootstrapping is pervasive doesn’t mean there are no clear distinctions 
among forms of bootstrapping that allow us to identify the troubling versions. 
A. Substantive Distinctions 
Perhaps some forms of Y are substantively different from others in some 
dispositive way. But if Y is illegitimate, it should be rejected: It cannot 
legitimately enable anything. If, say, the Supreme Court ruled first that it had 
plenary jurisdiction to decide the outcome of any election and then chose the 
winner of a bitterly contested election, the allegedly enabling decision would be 
illegitimate and should be rejected in its own right. There would be no need to 
consider the legitimacy or implications of the choice of a winner, because the 
entire foundation was infirm. 
And if Y is permissible, distinguishing among more and less appropriate Ys 
is a fool’s errand. On what basis would we place congressional enactments or 
Supreme Court holdings on this continuum? By how many times they have 
been favorably cited? By how central they seem to have become in our lives? 
By how much controversy they have created? There is no answer to these 
questions.44 Wisely, those concerned about bootstraps do not ask us to consider 
them. The stated concern is not with the legitimacy of Y. Concerns about 
 
 42.  347 U.S. 483 (1954); see supra notes 1–3.  
 43.  See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 44.  We could try to create different categories of Ys based on how generative they have been of 
Zs, but that assumes the conclusion that the Zs are permissible and are a useful measuring stick. 
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Congress bootstrapping EMTALA into an individual mandate do not depend 
on the propriety of EMTALA. The point is that EMTALA may be totally 
appropriate and legitimate, but using EMTALA to justify an individual 
mandate is illegitimate. Why? Apparently, because there is no stopping point: 
once one allows EMTALA to be used in this way, Congress can claim whatever 
powers it wants.45 
Some might object that this rejection of distinctions among categories of Ys 
is too hasty. Aren’t there meaningful distinctions we can draw among them? 
Each of us can of course identify enactments and opinions we prefer (e.g., ones 
that we think are more public-regarding, or ones with better provenance),46 but 
that is possible for all legal decisions. If we accept such grounds, then we can 
apply our criteria directly to Zs and dispense with any focus on bootstraps. One 
possible distinction is between bootstraps in which the entity relies on the 
impact of its own action and those in which it does not.47 But, as the discussion 
so far indicates, in every bootstrap an actor is relying on the impact of its first 
action to enable a later action, usually directly. 
A more nuanced variation on this argument is that we might try to 
distinguish Ys arising on their own from those that Congress creates. The idea is 
that with Ys that have arisen on their own via private conduct, there is only one 
jump (between Y and Z), but with congressionally created Ys, there are two 
jumps (to Y, and then between Y and Z). But this distinction depends on a false 
dichotomy between Ys that arise on their own and those mandated by the 
government. No Y arises entirely on its own. Every private activity relies on a 
backdrop created in part by prior government actions. Some Ys might seem to 
have arisen more naturally than others, but the Ys will be on a continuum in 
this regard. And even statutory Ys designed to codify an existing practice police 
outliers and circumscribe future conduct, and thus change the playing field.48 
 
 45.  See supra notes 25–29. 
 46.  See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 402 (1819) (emphasizing that “[t]he 
bill for incorporating the Bank of the United States . . . [was] supported by arguments which convinced 
minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast”); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 747, 755 (1999) (“[Marshall] opens his opinion by reminding us that the 1791 bill 
creating the first bank was supported by ‘minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast.’ The 
reference here is to the sainted Washington, who added his name to the bill and thus made it law only 
after satisfying himself of its constitutionality.”) (internal citation omitted).  
 47.  John Eastman made a more specific argument analogous to this, focusing on the Supreme 
Court and the Commerce Clause. John Eastman in the Sacramento Bee: Health Care Reform 
Challenge? It’s the Law, JOHN EASTMAN FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://www.eastmanforag.com/news/john-eastman-in-the-sacramento-bee-health-care-reform-
challenge-its-the-law (“[T]he Supreme Court has never before allowed Congress to bootstrap its way 
into Commerce Clause authority by relying on the impact of its own regulation.”). 
 48.  Consider EMTALA in this regard. Before EMTALA, some emergency rooms voluntarily 
treated patients who could not pay, and some federally funded emergency rooms had some treatment 
obligations. See Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the 
Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 BYU L. REV. 971, 980 (1992) (discussing 1946 legislation 
known as the Hill-Burton Act that required hospitals “receiv[ing] federal funds for construction and 
capital improvements to furnish a ‘reasonable’ amount of free or reduced-cost care to indigent 
patients,” and the “widespread agreement that this program has been a complete failure with respect to 
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The degree of naturally occurring activities underpinning Y may lead us to 
conclude that a given Y is undesirable or unwise. But that is not an argument 
about bootstrapping; it is an argument about the underlying attractiveness of Y. 
This brings us to the most prominent of the arguments against the individual 
mandate—that it is regulating inaction instead of action. I will assume, for 
purposes of this discussion, that the opponents are correct in asserting that the 
individual mandate involves a different form of regulation than Congress has 
attempted before. That may affect some aspects of the argument about the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, but it has no logical relationship to 
arguments about the legitimacy of this bootstrap. Bootstraps do not work 
differently when they enable regulation of action rather than inaction, any more 
than they do when they enable government actions that enhance rather than 
constrict civil liberties. This particular bootstrap may produce consequences we 
do not like (here, by hypothesis, allowing regulation of inaction), but the 
mechanism of the bootstrap is the same—one regulation has enabled another.49 
Suppose the Supreme Court relied on its statement that the First 
Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of 
the public”50 to hold that the First Amendment has a positive component that 
empowers Congress to regulate speech (rather than merely prohibiting 
government abridgements of speech). Some might consider this conclusion to 
be wrongheaded and a misreading of the First Amendment, but the mechanism 
of building upon previous opinions would be the same as it has been in 
hundreds of other cases. The earlier cases would enable the “wrong” 
conclusion, but the mechanism of that enablement would be the same one that 
courts routinely use. 
One last substantive distinction bears discussion: One might want to 
distinguish the Supreme Court from other actors, on the grounds that the Court 
holds Y and then Z because the issue was presented to it and it felt compelled 
to reach that result. Congress and the President, on the other hand, freely 
 
increasing the supply of indigent care”); W. Adam Malizio, Note, Moses v. Providence Hospital: The 
Sixth Circuit Dumps the Federal Regulations of the Patient Anti-Dumping Statute, 27 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 213, 215 (2010) (recounting the failure of the Hill-Burton Act to ensure care and 
adding that “[i]n an effort to address the problem of patient dumping on a broad scale, Congress passed 
[EMTALA]”); Jennifer M. Smith, Screen, Stabilize, and Ship: EMTALA, U.S. Hospitals, and 
Undocumented Immigrants (International Patient Dumping), 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 309, 321 
(2010) (recounting the “ineffective[ness]” of the Hill-Burton Act and stating that “Congress’ enactment 
of EMTALA was the direct response to the American public’s outcry over the inhumane treatment of 
the poor”). But whatever percentage of emergency rooms already provided uncompensated care, 
EMTALA changed the legal landscape by compelling free care. 
 49.  One can draw a distinction between bootstraps enabling regulation of action and bootstraps 
enabling regulation of inaction, but that would be an ad hoc judgment reflecting a desire not to allow 
this bootstrap (or maybe to stop the continued growth of bootstrapping). That is, the distinction would 
reflect a distaste for Z, but it would not reflect anything different about the bootstrapping process.  
 50.  Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663–64 (1994) (quoting some of this language from Associated Press); Leathers v. 
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 459 (1991) (same). 
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choose what topics to act on and how to act on them. In this way, the Court 
arguably is not bootstrapping in the same way as Congress and the President, 
because its holdings do not represent the same sort of volition. 
This of course implicates one of the fundamental debates in law about the 
nature of judging, one that I will not attempt to resolve here. A few points bear 
noting, however. First, as to what matters are addressed, the Supreme Court has 
a great deal of control over which cases it hears. The Court cannot choose to 
decide an issue if no petition presents it, but it can choose among the issues 
presented to it. Second, as to the decisions it reaches, few if any people believe 
that Justices are completely without volition. The only question is how much 
volition Justices exercise in reaching their conclusions. And the relevant 
question for my purposes is whether the divergence in volition between Justices 
on the one hand and members of Congress and the President on the other 
distinguishes the bootstrapping of the former from that of the latter in some 
relevant way. After all, once they have some ability to shape their agenda and 
some ability to exercise volition in reaching their conclusions, actors have the 
ability to aggrandize their power through bootstrapping. The degree of that 
ability differs for Justices versus members of Congress and the President, but it 
is far from clear that this difference in degree translates into a dispositive 
difference in the approach one should take to their bootstrapping. For my 
purposes, relatively little turns on the answer to that question. In the remainder 
of this article, I consider the Supreme Court’s bootstrapping alongside that of 
Congress and the President. But the key contentions in this article stand even if 
one rejects the applicability of bootstrapping to the Supreme Court. 
B. Purpose 
I can imagine forms of bootstrapping that virtually everyone would 
condemn—for example, a President who, after a terrorist attack, issues an 
executive order that declares, “In this order I make a finding of a national 
emergency so that I have a justification for arrogating to myself near-dictatorial 
authority to respond to terrorism.” And we might extend the category beyond 
such brazen situations to any in which a political actor makes decision Y solely, 
or at least centrally, to allow it to make a decision Z that would be legally 
problematic absent Y. If, for instance, Congress’s sole purpose in enacting 
legislative provision Y is to pave the way for a legislative provision Z that would 
be impermissible but for Y, then let us assume that Congress has acted 
illegitimately. 
This implicates longstanding debates about the circumstances under which it 
is useful to attempt to determine a lawmaker’s subjective motivation or 
apparent purpose in making a particular decision.51 One element of these 
 
 51.  I am referring here to a distinction made by many commentators between the decisionmaker’s 
subjective motivation and its objective purposes. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s 
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 793–94 (2001) (distinguishing legislators’ subjective motives from 
objective legislative purpose); Ira M. Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation and the Friendly 
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debates involves the difficulty of an observer’s determining the lawmaker’s 
actual purpose. Assuming that a lawmaker has a purpose, an observer (notably, 
a court) may not be able to reliably determine that purpose. A second, 
antecedent element is the usefulness of the notion of a purpose, particularly in a 
multimember context. Kenneth Shepsle noted twenty years ago that Congress is 
a “they,” not an “it,” and contended that “[i]ndividuals have intentions and 
purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not. To pretend otherwise is 
fanciful.”52 
I do not take a position on these broad questions about the ontological 
significance and epistemic value of lawmakers’ purpose, because it is not 
necessary for my purposes.53 Whatever one’s answers to these questions, 
aggrandizement is a bad candidate for a focus on purpose. There may be some 
goals of such importance to both constituents and representatives that they are 
central to the legislators who vote for legislation that achieves those goals. If, 
for example, a majority of a given set of constituents and legislators desired the 
subordination of one or more racial groups, we might feel confident in 
identifying racism as the purpose of legislation that clearly harmed the 
disfavored race(s). Aggrandizement is different in two ways. First, there is little 
basis for concluding that aggrandizement is of central importance to 
legislators.54 Congress has had ample opportunities to aggrandize its power in 
 
Critics, 49 CAL L. REV. 104, 115–16 (1961) (same). Others reject the distinction. See, e.g., John Hart 
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217–21 
(1970); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 426 n.40 (1996); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court 
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1143 
(1986). As my arguments make clear, I do not think anything turns on a distinction between subjective 
motivation and objective purpose in the bootstrapping context, so those who reject this distinction can 
ignore this footnote and erase it from their memories (if it is possible to do so, see The Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004)). 
 52.  Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992); see also Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
863, 870 (1930) (“The least reflection makes clear that the law maker . . . does not exist, and only worse 
confusion follows when in his place there are substituted the members of the legislature as a body. A 
legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men 
drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority 
might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (“Because legislatures comprise many members, 
they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a 
design. The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes.”). 
  The Supreme Court is smaller, but the same concern arises about divining its purposes. See 
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 94 (2004). The President, 
as a single person, avoids the multiperson difficulty. The problem of identifying a sole, or even central, 
purpose remains for presidential decisions, but at least the President is a single decisionmaker. See infra 
notes 75–79 and accompanying text.  
  Others disagree, of course, and contend that inquiries into purpose, including the purpose of 
multimember bodies, is useful and appropriate. E.g., Regan, supra note 51, at 1143 (“[T]here is no good 
general objection to motive review.”); Ely, supra note 51, at 1220–21; Kagan, supra note 51, at 439–41. 
 53.  Pardon the pun. 
 54.  As Joseph Blocher notes in his response to this article, “Congress A might not have sufficient 
incentive to aggrandize the power of Congress B; the personal and party interests of individual 
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exactly the ways that opponents of the individual mandate fear, but its actions 
have been fairly modest.55 Aggrandizement simply has not manifested itself as a 
clear and central goal of members of Congress. The second and more important 
difference flows from the fact that constituents will not deeply desire 
aggrandizement. The fear of aggrandizement is grounded in agency costs: 
Legislators will have an interest in aggrandizing their power despite their 
constituents’ lack of interest in it, and will achieve aggrandizement by 
smuggling aggrandizement into legislation that constituents find acceptable for 
other reasons.56 The key point is that there will be other reasons for constituents 
to support the legislation. Aggrandizement comes packaged in a substantive 
proposal, and some aspect of that substantive proposal is what makes it 
acceptable, if not desirable, for constituents. And many members of Congress 
may support the legislation for the same reason their constituents do (or in 
response to their constituents’ support) and have no particular interest in 
aggrandizement. The aggrandizement will be part of an initiative with aspects 
attractive to those uninterested in aggrandizement. And the particular balance 
for the decisionmaking body, or for any member of it, may not be knowable or 
even identifiable. 
Consider the following hypothetical: A powerful organization in a given 
congressional district visits the district’s member of Congress and persuades her 
that change Z in the law will allow it to expand its beneficial activities in her 
district while doing no harm to any constituency the member of Congress cares 
about. Z has no obvious connection to commerce, but it can be packaged with 
another proposal Y that clearly affects commerce and might have modest 
benefits, and that neither the organization nor any significant constituency 
opposes. The member of Congress decides to introduce legislation that would 
achieve the organization’s aims. The resulting legislation builds on the existing 
state of the world; adds to an existing regulatory regime; packages Y and Z 
together into a broad initiative; and has findings containing assertions that 
support treating the legislation as a permissible exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority. In other words, the legislation is filled with forms 
of bootstrapping. 
Let us imagine that the member of Congress drafted the legislation herself 
and has a sufficiently deep background in constitutional law to understand the 
need for the bootstraps. By hypothesis, she understands that Z would be legally 
problematic absent Y, and she is aware that her inclusion of Y enables her 
inclusion of Z. So we might reasonably infer that she has an apparent purpose 
 
representatives probably outweigh their interests in expanding the power of the institution itself.” 
Joseph Blocher, What We Fret About When We Fret About Bootstrapping, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 3, 2012 at 146, 151; see generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of 
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) (arguing that members of Congress are primarily 
loyal to their party, not to Congress).  
 55.  See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 56.  Unless we believe that constituents want aggrandizement, in which case the push against 
aggrandizement is both antidemocratic and doomed to failure. 
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of bootstrapping by including Y in the legislation. But an apparent purpose to 
bootstrap does not necessarily entail a purpose to aggrandize. Here, the 
aggrandizement seems to be a byproduct of the legislator’s desire to help the 
organization. And, of course, even if there were a purpose to aggrandize, that 
does not mean that this was the sole or central purpose for the drafter (much 
less for her colleagues who voted for it).57 
One could respond that this is setting the bar too high: Even if 
aggrandizement is a byproduct, the member was aware of the aggrandizement 
and it is still fairly treated as an apparent purpose—and that is sufficient to 
render the bootstrapping problematic. In other words, instead of focusing on a 
sole or central purpose, one could say bootstrapping is illegitimate if the actor 
had an awareness of aggrandizement or an apparent purpose to aggrandize. But 
that cuts much too broadly. As I have noted, every piece of legislation relies on 
various forms of bootstrapping, and drafters are aware of the ways in which 
they rely on existing regulatory schemes and provisions in the legislation at 
issue—that is part of the drafters’ job (and a reason why members of Congress 
do not draft on their own, but instead rely on their staff and the Office of the 
Legislative Counsel). 
The paragraph above may seem to suggest that illegitimate bootstrapping 
can be distinguished by creating a threshold that is less than the predominant 
purpose but more than a purpose.58 But in fact this discussion highlights an 
additional problem with attempting to consider any chosen threshold for 
 
 57.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice 
Scalia stated:  
[A] particular legislator need not have voted for the Act either because he wanted to foster 
religion or because he wanted to improve education. He may have thought the bill would 
provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction of his party he 
had alienated on another vote, or he may have been a close friend of the bill’s sponsor, or he 
may have been repaying a favor he owed the majority leader, or he may have hoped the 
Governor would appreciate his vote and make a fundraising appearance for him, or he may 
have been pressured to vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or by a flood of 
constituent mail, or he may have been seeking favorable publicity, or he may have been 
reluctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill, or he may have 
been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed the bill, or he may have been mad at 
his wife who opposed the bill, or he may have been intoxicated and utterly unmotivated when 
the vote was called, or he may have accidentally voted “yes” instead of “no,” or, of course, he 
may have had (and very likely did have) a combination of some of the above and many other 
motivations. To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for 
something that does not exist. 
Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 58.  This is akin to a distinction drawn in some Establishment Clause cases. See, e.g., McCreary 
Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the government acts with the ostensible and 
predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates th[e] central Establishment Clause value of 
official religious neutrality.”); id. at 901 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court replaces Lemon’s 
requirement that the government have ‘a secular . . . purpose,’ with the heightened requirement that 
the secular purpose ‘predominate’ over any purpose to advance religion.”) (quoting Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring) (“A religious 
purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose must 
predominate.”). 
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purpose in the bootstrapping context: With one possible exception discussed 
below, this approach will not usefully distinguish among bootstraps. There are 
myriad elements in any given piece of new legislation and in prior legislation 
that enable all the elements in that new legislation. No one believes that all such 
bootstraps are illegitimate (if so, every piece of legislation would be 
illegitimate). The question is whether one can distinguish some bootstraps from 
others, and the problem is that there is no reason to believe that the drafter(s), 
sponsor(s), or supporter(s) will have different purposes for different bootstraps 
that achieve the same goal. To return to the example above, insofar as one or 
more members of Congress have some set of purposes in pushing to enact Z, 
they will have the same purposes with respect to all the bootstraps necessary, 
because the bootstraps would serve the same instrumental goal. All the 
conditions precedent enable Z, and thus all have instrumental value to the 
proponents of a given initiative. Some of the conditions precedent might be 
more important to the drafter because they seem truly necessary for the 
initiative to pass muster, as opposed to other conditions precedent that might 
seem helpful but not absolutely necessary. But that is just another way of saying 
that to achieve one’s purposes (whatever they may be), some building blocks 
are more essential than others. And this tells us nothing about those purposes. 
If Y is useful but not absolutely necessary to justify Z and some other aspect of 
the legislation is absolutely necessary, then the latter may be more important to 
the drafter and to the sponsors. This gives us no information about the degree 
to which their purpose was aggrandizement. 
C. The Significance of Simultaneity 
The one possible exception to the inability to distinguish among bootstraps 
based on purpose (or anything else) involves uncertainty. Some acts contain 
both Y and Z, meaning that Y’s enablement of Z is certain. At the other 
extreme, some acts contain what turns out to be a Y (that is, an enablement of 
some Z), but not only is the promulgation of Z unclear—even the status of Y as 
enabling that possible Z is unclear. In this second situation, the bootstrap would 
not merely be uncertain but in fact hard to foresee. Fears about a purpose to 
aggrandize would not be founded in this second situation, whereas they are at 
least plausible in cases of certain bootstraps. 
Uncertain bootstraps arise most notably in situations in which Y and Z are 
not simultaneous. There is often a significant time lag between Y and Z, and 
often the significance of Y as enabling Z will not have been apparent at the time 
Y occurred. In effect, the bootstrapping is not only difficult to foresee but also 
retroactive. Indeed, many of the most prominent examples of congressional 
bootstrapping involve situations in which there was little incentive to bootstrap 
because at the time of action Y people did not believe that it was in fact 
necessary for action Z. 
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Reno v. ACLU provides one such example.59 When Congress enacted the 
Radio Act of 192760 and then built on that legislation in the Communications 
Act of 1934,61 there was no hint in the discussion in Congress or among 
commentators about the possible relevance of the regulations’ breadth to any 
First Amendment challenges. The most widely held assumption was that the 
First Amendment had little, if any, impact on government regulation of 
broadcasters’ speech. And early court cases embodied this view.62 It is unlikely 
that members of Congress imagined that the breadth of the regulations they 
imposed on broadcasters would have any impact on the likelihood of courts 
invalidating their regulations on First Amendment grounds. The danger of 
invalidation would have seemed remote, and there was no particular reason to 
assume that the breadth of the other regulations would be relevant. Decades 
later, however, the Supreme Court made this distinction dispositive when it 
invalidated the Communications Decency Act (applicable to the Internet) in 
Reno v. ACLU, despite Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica 
Foundation63 (which had permitted indecency regulation of broadcasts). 
Another instance of retroactive bootstrapping arose from a different line of 
Supreme Court cases. In Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.,64 the 
Supreme Court upheld a program that compelled California peach growers to 
contribute to a fund used to advertise California peaches. Four years later, in 
United Foods v. United States,65 the Supreme Court invalidated a very similar 
program compelling mushroom growers to contribute to a fund to advertise 
mushrooms. The difference, according to the Court, lay in the fact that 
Glickman involved a wide-ranging regulatory program and United Foods did 
not.66 The Court thus found the presence of comprehensive regulation 
dispositive. Indeed, here the significance of such regulation was quite great: The 
 
 59.  521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 60.  Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 
Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–620 (2006)). 
 61. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–620 (2006)). 
 62.  See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 62 F.2d 850, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1932) 
(stating that the First Amendment applies to prior restraints, and that refusing to renew a broadcaster 
based on his earlier broadcasts does not implicate the First Amendment). 
 63.  438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 64.  521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
 65.  533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
 66.  The programs at issue in the two cases were very similar. Both required growers to contribute 
to a program that would fund generic advertising of the product grown. Both programs were 
mandatory, once a majority of farmers voted to initiate it. But the Supreme Court found one program 
constitutional and the other unconstitutional. The difference, according to the Court in United Foods, 
was in the larger regulatory scheme surrounding the two advertising programs: 
The program sustained in Glickman differs from the one under review in a most fundamental 
respect. In Glickman the mandated assessments for speech were ancillary to a more 
comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy. Here, for all practical purposes, the 
advertising itself, far from being ancillary, is the principal object of the regulatory scheme. 
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411–12. The Sixth Circuit had similarly distinguished the mushroom program. 
See United Foods v. United States, 197 F.3d 221, 222 (6th Cir. 1999).  
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Court in Glickman concluded that the challenged regulation did not have to 
survive any level of First Amendment scrutiny, because the advertising program 
was part of an economic regulation that was not subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny in the first place;67 by contrast, the First Amendment did apply to (and 
invalidate) the program challenged in United Foods.68 
At the time Congress created these programs, it was not obvious (to put it 
mildly) that the applicability of the First Amendment to each fund would turn 
on the comprehensiveness of the program. Indeed, it was not clear how, if at all, 
the First Amendment might apply to them. There is no reason to believe that 
members of Congress thought that anything, as a First Amendment matter, 
turned on how pervasive their scheme was. And seven of the Justices on the 
Supreme Court saw no significance to this distinction at the time these cases 
were decided. But the two other Justices drew a distinction based on 
comprehensiveness. As a result we now know that by the Supreme Court’s 
lights, a comprehensive program will enable Congress to require food producers 
to contribute to a fund to advertise their product. The status of Y (the 
comprehensive program) as an enabler thus only became clear years after the 
programs were created. 
In other situations, decisionmakers may take action Y with no particular 
intention of its being treated as an enabling precedent but with some awareness 
that it could be so treated, and a later action Z in fact treats it as an enabling 
precedent. Arguably, some of the decisions of the First Congress were in that 
position. Most of those in the First Congress made at least some of their 
decisions without intending them to bind, or even greatly influence, later 
Congresses, but they were likely aware of the possibility that their decisions 
could be treated as dispositive precedents (and later decisionmakers did treat 
them as enabling some actions and disabling others).69 
1. The Impact of a Simultaneity-Based Distinction on the Different 
Branches 
This discussion highlights the way that bootstraps depend on factors made 
relevant by other actors, often acting much later. That is the nature of tests. But 
this discussion also suggests a possible distinction among bootstraps: that 
between simultaneous and nonsimultaneous bootstraps. If a government 
institution takes actions Y and Z at the same time, uncertainty is eliminated. 
The actor ensures that Y leads to Z. This answers any question of whether the 
 
 67.  Glickman, 521 U.S. at 475. 
 68.  United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415–16.  
 69.  This point applies even to major constitutional debates in the first Congress, such as that on 
the President’s ability to remove executive officers. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the 
Supreme Court placed great emphasis on this debate and heralded it as “the decision of 1789.” But as 
Sai Prakash has noted about that debate, “[t]he vast majority of Representatives [in the first Congress] 
understood that Congress could express its views about the Constitution’s meaning and that, while the 
Decision of 1789 would be deserving of some deference, it would not decide the removal question for 
all time.” Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1075 
(2006). 
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bootstrap was foreseeable. It also eliminates questions about whether Z will in 
fact occur, and whether it will be Z or some variant of Z, by simply creating Z at 
the time it creates Y. The governmental entity acts with a presumed awareness 
that it has engaged in bootstrapping, and this arguably gives rise to an 
appearance of a purpose to bootstrap. So, insofar as one thinks that purpose is 
relevant, maybe we should distinguish simultaneous bootstraps from 
nonsimultaneous ones. 
A distinction between simultaneous and nonsimultaneous bootstraps could 
lead to an absolute bar to simultaneous bootstraps, a strong presumption 
against, a weak presumption against, etc. But this simply raises more questions, 
about not only the basis for a particular level of presumption but also what 
would overcome the presumption. And to answer that question we are back to 
the problems with drawing distinctions among bootstraps. One can distinguish 
simultaneous versus nonsimultaneous bootstraps, but that provides no basis for 
distinguishing among simultaneous bootstraps. And the difficulties discussed 
above with respect to possible distinctions among all bootstraps apply as well 
with respect to possible distinctions among simultaneous bootstraps. 
Whatever the form of the distinction, increasing the cost of simultaneous 
bootstraps will have profound consequences. The implications for Congress 
would be greatest. At the outset, note that Congress would be disabled from 
responding quickly to an emergency with a single piece of legislation that 
contained a bootstrap (for example, legislation after September 11 creating a 
federal cadre of airport screeners and regulations governing their behavior). Do 
we really want to tell Congress that even if there seems to be a crying need for a 
particular Z, it must respond in two steps? We could create an exception for 
particularly important or urgent bootstraps. But how would we define those 
with any clarity? Would a horribly lethal pandemic qualify as such an 
emergency?70 The collapse of Lehman Brothers? More importantly, once we are 
distinguishing among bootstraps based on their perceived importance or 
urgency, we are simply distinguishing among Zs. That is, we are back to 
distinguishing among bootstraps based on their outcome, not based on any 
element of the bootstrapping process. To put the point differently, there would 
be no difference in the way that Y enabled Z, or in the nature of the 
relationship between Y and Z; what would distinguish the permissible from the 
impermissible bootstrap would be the importance or urgency of Z. That is not 
an argument about bootstrapping. It is an argument about outcomes. 
A further problem for Congress is less obvious, but no less real. Any 
presumption or bar against simultaneous bootstraps will pose particular barriers 
for Congress. This flows from the fact that Congress has less ability to engage in 
a long-term process of aggrandizement than the other branches do. As many 
commentators have noted, the hurdles to passage of a given piece of legislation 
 
 70.  See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
1825, 1829 (2011) (noting relatedly that “authority under the commerce power to compel purchases or 
other actions could well be essential to combat a horrifically lethal pandemic”). 
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are numerous and subject to change—support by the relevant committees and 
their chairs, support not only by a majority of the House but also by a majority 
of the majority party in the House, in many cases support by a filibuster-proof 
majority in the Senate, and support by the President.71 Legislative coalitions 
change during each session of Congress, in response to the electoral calendar as 
well as public opinion, and of course the makeup of the House and Senate 
changes every two years. A second piece of legislation means a changed 
political environment, a new legislative coalition to bring together, and a new 
round of veto gates to overcome. No member of Congress can have any real 
confidence that the stars will align for a given future piece of legislation. 
Indeed, a ban or strong presumption against simultaneous bootstrapping 
could completely disable Congress from crafting legislation on some issues, 
because often the only way legislation can pass is if multiple elements are 
combined into one act. Starting with constitutional constraints, the best 
example arises from strict scrutiny. For any legislation that would be subject to 
strict scrutiny, a key element of that scrutiny is whether Congress has regulated 
comprehensively. A court will invalidate the legislation if the claimed 
compelling interest implicates activities that the legislation does not cover (that 
is, if Congress regulates only some of the activities that implicate that interest).72 
So breaking up legislation into separate parts could prevent a legislative 
response to an important issue by preventing constitutionally required 
comprehensiveness. 
Furthermore, both theory and practice indicate that successful legislation 
(especially on complex issues) often requires multiple related elements in order 
to satisfy the different groups needed to create a sufficiently large legislative 
coalition. Prominent among recent examples is the ACA.73 The individual 
mandate relied on the ban on denying coverage to those with preexisting 
conditions as an empirical matter, but the provisions on preexisting conditions 
relied on the individual mandate as a political matter. Insurance companies and 
other major stakeholders believed that without an individual mandate, the 
provisions on preexisting conditions would lead the sickest people to pay for 
insurance and many of the healthy remainder to take their chances (until they 
 
 71.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, and Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1441, 1444–48 (2008) (listing nine different vetogates that legislation must overcome); 
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 
705, 720 (1992) (noting the many vetogates that can block legislative initiatives). 
 72.  The Court has emphasized the importance of comprehensiveness in other contexts, notably 
including the Commerce Clause. See, for example, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981), 
stating, 
A complex regulatory program such as established by the Act can survive a Commerce Clause 
challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and 
directly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged provisions are an 
integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a 
whole satisfies this test. 
 73.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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were on the way to the emergency room, when they would sign up).74 The ban 
on denying coverage based on preexisting conditions had been popular for 
many years, but Congress could never enact it because of this opposition. 
Insurance companies dropped their opposition, allowing the provisions on 
preexisting conditions to be enacted, only when these provisions were paired 
with the individual mandate. In other words, if Congress had been required to 
enact the provisions on preexisting conditions and the individual mandate in 
separate pieces of legislation, then likely neither would have been enacted. And 
because the provisions on preexisting conditions were key (and among the most 
popular) elements of the health care reform proposals, without the linkage 
between the provisions on preexisting conditions and the individual mandate it 
seems unlikely that any major health care reform would have been enacted. 
Congress could have overcome this obstacle by establishing an unbreakable 
linkage between its (now separate) legislation on preexisting conditions and on 
the individual mandate. But an unbreakable linkage raises the same problems 
as are created by simultaneity in the first place—the members of Congress 
would know the result of their bootstrapping. By hypothesis, bootstraps with 
that level of certainty are different from other bootstraps and should be 
disfavored. So the way to avoid these seemingly problematic bootstraps is to 
eliminate that certainty. And once there is no certainty, complex legislation like 
health care reform becomes more difficult, if not impossible. 
With respect to the President, disfavoring simultaneous bootstraps will have 
very little impact. The President needs no one else’s vote in order to 
promulgate an executive order.75 A President with any meaningful time left in 
his term knows that he can issue two or three executive orders almost as easily 
as he can issue one, and more generally can make multiple decisions that build 
on each other.76 Indeed, this was precisely the fear that some commentators 
articulated during the George W. Bush Administration—that the Bush White 
House was pursuing a strategy of aggrandizing its power by playing the long 
game. Recall, for instance, the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to release 
the names of people who met with Vice President Cheney about energy policy.77 
As was widely noted at the time, it seems unlikely that the Administration was 
worried about releasing that information per se, but rather that it was using the 
matter to set a precedent that it could later expand.78 A more recent example 
 
 74.  See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 75.  See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. 
& ECON. 132, 133 (1999) (discussing “the president’s formal capacity for taking unilateral action and 
thus for making law on his own”). 
 76.  I say “almost as easily” because Presidents have always had an internal executive branch 
review process for executive orders, and so two orders entail two iterations of that process. But 
Presidents choose such review and thus can dispense with it, the review is not very onerous, and the 
President knows at the end of the day that the decisions on all aspects of a given executive order are his 
alone. 
 77.  See Joseph Kahn, Cheney Refuses to Release Energy Task Force Records, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2001, at A10. 
 78.  See Michael Abramowitz & Steven Mufson, Papers Detail Industry’s Role in Cheney’s Energy 
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arises from the United States’ role in Libya. President Obama concluded in 
June 2011 that our support for bombing in Libya did not constitute “hostilities,” 
based in significant part on the absence of United States ground forces, active 
exchanges of fire, or a serious threat of United States casualties.79 A President 
who wanted to gut the War Powers Act could build on that in future decisions 
to go much further, leading to the conclusion that he could use air power in any 
way he saw fit, even to the extent of making a long-term direct commitment of 
the United States Air Force, because the United States has total air superiority. 
This result would have seemed absurd pre-Libya. (Could the United States 
claim that a re-run of the World War II air attack on Dresden did not constitute 
“hostilities”?) But a President who sought to expand his power could begin with 
Libya and build on that precedent, ending up with a result that would have 
seemed absurd at the outset. 
For courts, in particular the Supreme Court, the costs of disfavoring 
simultaneous bootstraps will be significant, though not nearly as high as for 
Congress. In some circumstances the Supreme Court Justices can reasonably 
assume that there will be a durable majority for a result and that there will be 
ready future opportunities to reach that result.80 But that will often not be the 
 
Report, WASH. POST, July 18, 2007, at A01. 
 79.  See White House, United States Activities in Libya, at 25 (June 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/110615_United_States_Activities_in_Libya
_--_6_15_11.pdf (“U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with 
hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious 
threat thereof.”); Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya 
Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A16 (“Jack L. Goldsmith, who led the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel during the Bush administration, said the Obama theory would set a precedent 
expanding future presidents’ unauthorized war-making powers, especially given the rise of remote-
controlled combat technology. ‘The administration’s theory implies that the president can wage war 
with drones and all manner of offshore missiles without having to bother with the War Powers 
Resolution’s time limits,’ Mr. Goldsmith said.”). 
 80.  Consider Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193 (2009). I 
think it is plausible to imagine that at least one of the five Justices most likely to invalidate the Voting 
Rights Act thought there would be unacceptable costs to the Court if it invalidated it in NAMUDNO, 
but wanted ultimately to invalidate it. In such circumstances, what might such a Justice do? One 
possible answer is to bootstrap—to write the NAMUDNO opinion in a way that enables the future 
invalidation of the Voting Rights Act without the high costs to the Court. If our hypothetical Justice 
believed both that the majority of which he was a part was durable and that a future Voting Rights Act 
challenge would be brought, then the risks of this strategy would be fairly low and the benefits 
significant. 
  Whether or not this was in fact any Justice’s intention, I believe that the Court’s opinion in 
NAMUDNO has that effect. It sounds warnings about the Voting Rights Act and urges Congress to 
revise the act to save the Court from the need to do so. No one expects Congress to revise the Voting 
Rights Act—given the differing views in Congress and the many barriers to any legislation, it would be 
a minor miracle if the revisions the Court seeks were enacted. But the lack of a response to the Court’s 
call makes it easy for the Court in the future, when facing a constitutional challenge to the Voting 
Rights Act, to say that because Congress failed to revise the Act, the Court will invalidate the Act. 
What would seem illegitimate in one step will seem much less objectionable when done in two. This is a 
bootstrap that relies on congressional inaction, but it is a safe bet. Meanwhile, the Justices most likely 
to invalidate the Voting Rights Act knew, at the time NAMUDNO was decided, that their majority was 
likely to persist for at least five to ten years, either because none of them would retire (the most likely 
outcome) or because any Justice who did retire would be replaced by someone like-minded (since 
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case; and in any event disfavoring simultaneous bootstraps will impose 
significant costs. In a single opinion, the Supreme Court often has a significant 
holding and another significant holding that builds on the first. That is, the 
process of bootstrapping via precedent sometimes occurs in a single opinion: 
the Court thus undertakes Y and Z simultaneously. In Marbury v. Madison,81 
for instance, the Court’s significant holding on the scope of Article III’s 
original-jurisdiction provision enabled the Court to both consider the 
constitutionality of the Judiciary Act and assert the Court’s power of judicial 
review. The Court could have decided each of those issues separately, but that 
would have produced piecemeal opinions and piecemeal processes. 
Judges could try to minimize the inefficiencies by deciding all the issues at 
the same time and then simply splitting the resolution into different opinions. In 
effect, that is what happened in Brown v. Board of Education82 and Bolling v. 
Sharpe,83 decided on the same day. But that raises the same problems as 
simultaneity, namely the certainty of Z at the time that Y is decided. If judges 
decide all the issues at the same time, they have engaged in simultaneous 
bootstrapping. To avoid simultaneity, judges must decide the various steps 
separately, and that imposes significant costs on judges and lawyers (not to 
mention the parties involved in the cases). 
2. The Benefits of Such a Distinction 
Insofar as the fear of bootstrapping is a fear of aggrandizement, a focus on 
simultaneous bootstraps is a poor fit. A bar to or strong presumption against 
simultaneous bootstraps would impose enormous costs on Congress and 
significant costs on the Supreme Court, but it would impose no meaningful limit 
on the President. The President’s ability to aggrandize would be unaffected. 
Insofar as the fear of bootstrapping is focused more directly on congressional 
aggrandizement (which, of course, is the focus of the challenges to the 
individual mandate), it is not obvious why presidential aggrandizement should 
be exempted from this fear, and the costs imposed on courts are difficult to 
defend. And a fear of congressional and judicial but not presidential 
aggrandizement seems entirely arbitrary.84 
 
Justices can time their retirements). It was a high-probability bet, at the time NAMUDNO was decided, 
that if a majority was ready to invalidate the Voting Rights Act in 2009 but for the seeming 
inappropriateness of acting precipitously, a majority would be just as ready to invalidate it in 2014 or 
2019, at which point the Court could point to years of congressional inaction as a justification. And 
NAMUDNO was a sufficiently clear hint to litigants that the Justices could reasonably expect future 
challenges that would provide vehicles for considering the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. 
 81.  5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803).  
 82.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 83.  347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 84.  It may be that some critics of simultaneous bootstrapping are actually motivated by a desire to 
make complex legislation more difficult to enact (and perhaps complex Supreme Court opinions more 
difficult to create), perhaps on the theory that simultaneous bootstraps are likely not only to be 
complex but also to contain policy elements that they generally will not favor, or perhaps because they 
think that states should have more power relative to the federal government. If so, bootstrapping is a 
proxy for policy results they do not like. In any event, if that is their concern then critics should so state, 
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More fundamentally, this seems to be a situation in which the cure is worse 
than the disease. The argument against bootstrapping is based on its 
consequences. Here, the costs avoided (or benefits created) by disfavoring 
simultaneous bootstraps are outweighed by the costs of disfavoring them. 
Daryl Levinson has persuasively argued against the notion that our 
governing institutions, and in particular Congress, have great incentives to 
aggrandize their power.85 As Levinson notes, “neither the policy interests of 
constituents nor the self-serving goals of officials are likely to correlate in any 
systematic way with the power or wealth of government institutions.”86 This is 
not a matter of mere theorizing. In the years between Wickard v. Filburn87 and 
United States v. Lopez,88 the widespread assumption was that the Commerce 
Clause posed no meaningful hurdle for congressional legislation, but Congress 
left many areas subject only to state regulation. Congress did of course enact 
many regulations, but I do not think anyone could fairly argue that Congress 
inexorably increased its power, much less ran amok. Indeed, Congress increased 
its role in some areas but reduced its role in others. 
Note in this regard that bootstrapping is costly for the bootstrapper, because 
undertaking Y is by definition a significant step in its own right. (If it is not a 
significant step, then there is no bootstrap.) An actor that wants to achieve Z 
has to incur the cost of Y to do so, and that cost will usually be substantial. 
Consider pervasive regulation. It is true that if Congress’s goal is to regulate 
farmers’ collective speech about their products, it now knows what to do: 
Create a pervasive regulatory scheme and embed speech regulations as part of 
it.89 So a Congress that wants to regulate farmers’ collective speech can do so, 
but only if it is willing to incur the costs associated with creating the much larger 
regime in which to embed it. To use another example, even if Congress had 
designed EMTALA to pave the way for an individual mandate (quite unlikely, 
but let’s indulge the assumption), we still have the fact that it did pass 
EMTALA, and enacting any regulation entails nontrivial costs for Congress. 
Indeed, simultaneous bootstraps have a significant advantage over 
nonsimultaneous bootstraps. One fear about bootstraps is that an actor will 
move in degrees (as in a slippery slope) and thus make its destination difficult 
to determine. We the citizens will be boiled like a frog in slowly heating water.90 
Simultaneous bootstraps avoid such an accretive process by containing Y and Z 
 
so that we can then assess that argument on its merits. 
 85.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915 (2005). 
 86.  Id. at 916. 
 87.  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 88.  514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 89.  See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); United Foods v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 405 (2001); supra text accompanying notes 64–68.  
 90.  Apparently, this is not actually true of frogs, but the metaphor has taken root nonetheless. See, 
e.g., Next Time, What Say We Boil a Consultant, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 31, 1995), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/01/frog.html (quoting numerous experts who said that a frog 
would, in fact, jump out of the water). 
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in a single act. They thus have the significant advantage of transparency. 
Whatever other complaints citizens may have about the ACA, they cannot 
complain that Congress enacted a popular ban on preexisting conditions while 
hiding its intention of enacting a less popular individual mandate. Congress 
revealed both steps at the same, a benefit that would be lost if simultaneous 
bootstraps were disallowed. 
Interestingly, focusing on simultaneous bootstraps would divert attention 
and energy from a greater danger of aggrandizement. As Levinson 
acknowledges, the constraints on aggrandizement have less force with respect to 
the President.91 And the President’s ability to engage in aggrandizement via 
bootstrapping would be only marginally affected by a limit on simultaneous 
bootstrapping. So not only would a limit on simultaneity have modest benefits, 
but it would also ignore the potentially greater aggrandizer. 
The point here is that the benefits of disfavoring simultaneous bootstraps 
will be much smaller than its costs. The incentives to engage in bootstrapping 
are not very great, and the costs of disfavoring bootstraps are substantial. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Concerns about bootstrapping do not arise from any provision in the 
Constitution. They arise from a fear about the consequences of bootstrapping. 
The problem, as this article has demonstrated, is that bootstrapping is 
pervasive. The consequences of freely allowing bootstrapping are modest. It is 
the world that we inhabit, and the sky has not fallen. The consequences of 
disfavoring bootstrapping would be massive. The one distinction that has any 
traction—between simultaneous and nonsimultaneous bootstraps—still creates 
costs that greatly outweigh the benefits. 
Whether or not those who have raised concerns about bootstrapping in the 
ACA have put forward persuasive arguments against the legitimacy of the 
individual mandate, the problem is not the legitimacy of bootstrapping. If the 
final destination is impermissible, so be it. But that does not mean that the 
pathway should be abandoned as well. 
 
 
 91.  See Levinson, supra note 85, at 956.  
